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The financial foundations of the United States and its federal government were
created in three years, 1790-1792. Before 1790, the government was effectively
bankrupt. Without tax revenues until late in 1789—after the newly created Treasury
Department opened in September of that year, it managed to collect by year end a grand
total of $162,200 in custom duties—the U.S. government was in default on almost all of
its large domestic debts left over from the Revolution, as well as on most its foreign debts
incurred in the struggle. The new nation lacked a national currency, a national bank, a
banking system, and regularly functioning securities markets. It had only a couple of
dozen business corporations the states had chartered during the 1780s.
The financial revolution of 1790-1792 changed all that. In 1793, the government
collected almost $4.7 million in tax revenue, more than enough to fund government
operations and meet interest payments on the national debt. By 1793, a federally
chartered Bank of the United States had opened at Philadelphia with branches in several
cities, as had the U.S. Mint to produce silver and gold coins in the newly defined dollar
unit of account. Several states had chartered ten more banks to join the first three bank
start-ups of the 1780s, one of which operated without a corporate charter until 1791.
Along with the national bank and its branches, these banks were interacting with one
another as a banking system.
Forty-four new business corporations, including the banks, received charters in
1790-1792: more in three years than the total of seven in the entire colonial era and the
24 of the 1780s. Securities markets in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston priced every
business day the $63 million of restructured domestic U.S. debt that began to appear in
late 1790, as well as the $10 million in stock of the Bank of the United States and the
stock of state banks and non-banking corporations.
1 These markets had even survived
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their first bubbles, panics, and crashes in 1791 and 1792 (Sylla, Wright, and Cowen
2009). Financially, by 1793 the United States looked surprisingly modern. In 1789 it was
decidedly pre-modern.
Because of the events of 1790-1792, from that time forward Americans and most
of their historians could assume, correctly, that a modern financial system always existed
in their country. But too often incorrectly, they also assumed there was nothing special,
unique, or even good about it. Since modern economies by definition have modern
financial systems, much of U.S. financial historiography has focused on the unseemly,
negative features of these systems. Taxes and public spending are too high. The national
debt is too big and ought to be reduced. Large banks are a threat to economic stability and
perhaps even the people’s liberties. Banks take too many risks and too often fail. Stock
markets are the dens of speculators and thieves, and too often they crash. Business
corporations have too many privileges and too much influence in American life.
These widely trumpeted opinions of our time are nothing new. They have been
voiced throughout U.S. history since 1790. But they were not voiced in America before
1790, or in most other countries until long after 1790.
The United States was one of the first nations to modernize its finances. Only two
nations did so earlier—the Dutch Republic (the modern Netherlands) about two centuries
before the United States, and Great Britain starting perhaps a century earlier. Neither
modernized as completely as the United States did 1800, and neither did it within three
years, or even three decades (Rousseau and Sylla, 2003, 2005; Sylla 2009).
This chapter attempts to answer several questions. How did so much modernizing
economic and financial change happen so quickly at the start of U.S. history? What were
the specific choices made and actions taken during 1790-1792 that made it happen? How
were they challenged? How were they defended? Did the financial revolution happen as
easily as is sometimes assumed from its sheer rapidity? And finally, what difference did
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the financial revolution make for what happened after it occurred? In particular, what
was its impact on the growth of the U.S. economy?
1. Hatching and Shaping the Plan
The origins of the financial revolution of the early 1790s can be traced to the
seemingly insurmountable financial difficulties of the last years of the War of
Independence. Then, the Confederation Congress saw its paper money become worthless
and, having no tax powers, it struggled to find ways to pay its army and its debts
(Ferguson 1961). Congress appointed Robert Morris, a wealthy merchant and financier,
to be Superintendent of Finance in 1781. Morris managed to fund the decisive Yorktown
campaign and victory in October of that year, and to persuade Congress to charter the
first American bank, the Bank of North America, shortly thereafter. But Congress failed
to enact most other financial reforms Morris recommended, and he resigned in frustration
in 1784.
Financial difficulties in countries are common, particularly during times of war,
and there were lots of such times during the eighteenth century. Financial revolutions,
however, are rare. How, then, did the financial difficulties experienced by Americans
during the War of Independence lead to a financial revolution a decade later?
Subsequent events would reveal that the initial plans for a U.S. financial
revolution were hatched in several letters—more accurately essays—on political
economy that Alexander Hamilton wrote between late 1779 and early 1781. Hamilton at
the time was a lieutenant colonel in the Continental Army and the principal aide de camp
to General Washington, the American commander. In his long letters to U.S. leaders,
Hamilton demonstrated an unusual understanding of financial history, gained from his
recent study of the works of Malachy Postlethwaite, David Hume, Richard Price, Adam
Smith, and others (McDonald 1979, 35). The letters indicate that Hamilton knew quite a
lot about the successful financial revolutions of the Dutch and the British, and the aborted
efforts of John Law in France. From those histories he drew the conclusion that finance
was the key both to state power and economic growth. Applying his historical
understanding to the situation of the United States, he began to formulate plans for what5
would become the US financial revolution a decade later. In 1789, as the first Secretary
of the Treasury of the new federal government, Hamilton would execute a more refined
version of a plan he had hatched a decade earlier and then developed during the 1780s.
The setting for Hamilton’s letter-essays was the dire situation of the American
revolutionaries in 1779-1781. The war had dragged on for five years. Paper
“Continental Currency,” first authorized and issued by Congress in 1775, and then issued
to excess by 1778-1779, was well on its way to becoming worthless by 1780. Taxation
then was in the hands of the states. To meet the requisitions of Congress, states were
supposed to levy wartime taxes payable in Continentals as well as in their own state
paper currencies. That would support the values of the paper currencies by making them
acceptable as a means of paying taxes and by reducing the amounts outstanding. But
taxes levied and collected by the states were woefully inadequate to the task, so
Continental paper dollars depreciated to the point where it took about 40 paper dollars to
purchase a dollar in hard-money coins by the start of 1780, and about 100 paper dollars to
buy a dollar in specie by the beginning of 1781 (Perkins 1994, 97). Borrowing, an
alternative to taxation and money printing as a method of public finance, also proved
difficult both at home and abroad, in part because ineffective taxation and excessive
money printing undermined whatever confidence lenders might otherwise have had in the
revolutionary cause.
In his first letter on the dire U.S. financial situation (undated, but thought to have
been written between December 1779 and March 1780), Hamilton argued that the main
solution to the wartime financial problems of the Americans had to be a foreign loan,
most likely from France which already supported the American cause financially and
militarily: “The most opulent states of Europe in a war of any duration are commonly
obliged to have recourse to foreign loans and subsidies. How then could we expect to do
without them….” Part of the loan might used to buy up superfluous paper currency, but
Hamilton thought it would be better to turn it into merchandise (military supplies)
overseas and import the supplies to aid the undersupplied Continental Army. If that were
done, the Americans might be able to carry on the war for two or three more years. By
itself, however, a foreign loan would do little to restore the currency to a sound basis
(Syrett 1961-87, II, 234-51, quote at 237-38).
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A better plan, Hamilton reasoned, was to have Congress charter for ten years what
he already in 1780 called a “Bank of the United States,” and use the foreign loan to
provide some of the bank’s capital, with the rest to come from subscriptions to the bank’s
stock by private investors. The way to restore private confidence in paper money was to
have the Bank’s notes replace fiat paper money such as Continentals. The Bank would
hold specie reserves (gold and silver coins) and its notes would be convertible into hard
money. Bank paper money convertible into specie would achieve the goal of currency
stability. The U.S. government would own part of the Bank and share in its profits. And
it would receive a large loan from the Bank, at 4 percent interest, to finance the ongoing
war.
As precedents for his plan, Hamilton referred to John Law’s failed plans for
financial reforms in France, which nonetheless had some good features: “It will be our
wisdom to select what is good in [Law’s] plan and in any others that have gone before us,
avoiding their defects and excesses.” He also drew on the experience of the Bank of
England, a “striking example” of how far paper credit could be increased “when
supported by public authority and private influence.” He admired how British public
debt was absorbed and managed by the Bank of England, which strengthened the Bank
and enhanced the ability of the British government to borrow. Unlike the Bank of
England, however, Hamilton’s proposed Bank of the United States was not to have
exclusive privileges. While Hamilton supported increased state power, he was opposed
to monopoly as inimical to economic growth: “Large trading companies must be
beneficial to the commerce of a nation, when they are not invested with [exclusive
privileges]; because they furnish a capital with which the most extensive enterprises may
be undertaken (Syrett 1961-87, II, 245, 249, 250).
Hamilton’s first letter on financial reform foreshadowed several of the key
elements of modern financial systems, most notably a central bank issuing paper money
(bank notes) convertible into specie, which the bank would hold as reserves. It was a
plan to stabilize the currency of a country whose paper currency had lost most of its
value. The bank would also lend to the government, thus strengthening public finances
and supporting a public debt market. It would be a corporation without exclusive
privileges, and such enterprises would foster economic growth.7
Hamilton addressed a second letter-essay in September, 1780, to James Duane, a
New York delegate to the Continental Congress. In it Hamilton’s political economy
advanced to a higher plane. The fundamental problem of the United States was that the
national government did not have sufficient vigor, and especially sufficient means, to
meet public exigencies. The national government needed to be altered. It needed to have
the power of the purse: “All imposts [import taxes] upon commerce ought to be laid by
Congress and appropriated for their use, for without certain revenues a government can
have no power; that power, which holds the purse strings absolutely, must rule.”
There were two sets of remedies. First, the national government had to have the
power to govern and wage war. Hamilton asserted that Congress, having declared the
independence of the United States, already had such powers, but—fearful of state
objections—Congress was too timid to use them. Recognizing that few would agree with
his bold call for Congress to assert sovereign powers, Hamilton recommended that
Congress immediately convene a convention of the states to provide the national
government with competent powers. This, in 1780, appears to be the first call by any
American for a constitutional restructuring of U.S. government, and issues of public
finance were at the heart of it. Passages in the letter, in fact, sound a lot like Article I,
Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution written seven years later (Syrett 1961, II, 400-18,
quote at 404).
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Second, to supply the army, Hamilton proposed to Duane a four-step approach: a
foreign loan (most likely from France), pecuniary taxes, a tax in kind, and a bank founded
on public and private credit. In connection with the bank proposal, Hamilton discussed
the origins of modern banking in Venice, the Banks of Amsterdam and England, and the
flaws in John Law’s system in France. The bank he outlined was similar to the Bank of
2 Compare Article I, Section 8, with this from Hamilton’s 1780 letter to Duane: “Congress should have
complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance, and to the management of foreign
affairs, the right of declaring war and raising armies, officering, paying them, directing their motions in
every respect, of equipping fleets and doing the same with them, of building fortifications arsenals
magazines &c., &c., of making peace on such conditions as they think proper, of regulating trade,
determining with what countries it shall be carried on, granting indulgences laying prohibitions on all
articles of export or import, imposing duties granting bounties & premiums for raising exporting importing
and applying to their own use the product of these duties, only giving credit to the states on whom they are
raised in the general account of revenues and expences, instituting Admiralty courts &c., of coining money,
establishing banks on such terms, and with such privileges as they think proper, appropriating funds and
doing whatever else relates to the operations of finance, transacting every thing with foreign nations,
making alliances offensive and defensive, treaties of commerce, &c., &c.” (Syrett 1961, II, 408).8
the United States proposed in the earlier letter, but now Hamilton says that it should have
three branches in three different states. Later, Hamilton’s 1790 proposal for a Bank of
the United States, enacted with a Hamilton-drafted congressional charter in 1791,
permitted the bank to have branches, and the Bank would open several branches ranging
from Boston to Charleston in 1792.
A third Hamilton letter-essay was to Robert Morris in April, 1781, shortly after
Congress had appointed Morris as its Superintendent of Finance to salvage revolutionary
finances after the collapse of paper Continentals.
3 After stressing the crucial importance
of finance—“Tis by introducing order into our finances—by restoring public credit—not
by gaining battles, that we are finally to gain our object” (Syrett 1961, 606)—Hamilton
said he intended to give Morris some ideas he had on financial administration, and a plan
that, while “crude and defective,” might be a “basis for something more perfect.” First,
he estimated the revenue capacity of the country and compared it with an estimate of
necessary civil and military expenses. The latter greatly exceeded the former, leaving a
revenue shortfall that had to be financed. Foreign loans might help, but could not do it
all. So a plan had to be devised, and Hamilton’s plan calls, as did the plans outlined in
his two previous letters, for establishing a national bank. He goes on to discuss the pros
and cons of national banks in theory and in history, including a statement of how banking
development and the expansion of credit promote both state power and economic growth:
The tendency of a national bank is to increase public and private credit.
The former gives power to the state for the protection of its rights and interests,
and the latter facilitates and extends the operations of commerce among
individuals. Industry is increased, commodities are multiplied, agriculture and
manufactures flourish, and herein consist the true wealth and prosperity of a state.
Most commercial nations have found it necessary to institute banks and
they have proved to be the happiest engines that ever were invented for advancing
trade. Venice Genoa Hamburgh (sic) Holland and England are examples of their
3 In the September 1780 letter to Duane, after recommending that Congress appoint “great officers of State”
to execute its decisions—the idea of an executive branch—Hamilton endorsed Robert Morris to head the
department of finance (Syrett 1961, 408-09).9
utility. They owe their riches, commerce, and the figure they have made at
different periods in a great degree to this source. Great Britain is indebted for the
immense efforts she has been able to make in so many illustrious and successful
wars essentially to that vast fabric of credit raised on this foundation. Tis by this
alone she now menaces our independence (Syrett 1961, II, 618).
Much of the remainder of Hamilton’s letter to Morris is given over to proposing
and discussing twenty articles, “only intended as outlines,” that would comprise the
national bank’s charter. The bank would be, for example, by law a corporation, which
seemed so obvious to Hamilton and to a businessman such as Morris that it “needs no
illustration,” although in America as elsewhere there were few business corporations
then. The letter ends with a brief discussion of the national debt after the war is over.
The debt would not present a problem, Hamilton said, because the country’s growth and a
good financial administration will easily enable the United States to pay it off in a matter
of decades. In fact, properly managed, it will be “a national blessing…a powerful cement
of our union” (Syrett 1961, II, 635).
Morris replied to Hamilton that he had been thinking along similar lines, although
the Bank of North America (BNA) that he soon proposed to Congress was more realistic
and less ambitious in scale and scope than the national bank Hamilton recommended
(Syrett 1961, II, 645-46). Interestingly, the proceeds of a foreign loan, as in Hamilton’s
plans, did become the source of most of BNA’s capital.
Hamilton’s letter-essays of 1779-1781 dealing with finance, state power, and
economic growth touched on all the main components of modern financial systems—
government revenues and public debts, money, banking and central banking,
corporations, and, at least implicitly, the securities markets that would arise to give
liquidity to government debt and corporate securities, that is, bonds and stocks. They
demonstrate an unusually modern grasp of the role of finance in political and economic
history. They also foreshadow the financial revolution Hamilton would execute a decade
later as Treasury Secretary.
The remarkable aspect of Hamilton’s early letter-essays on political economy and
finance is their demonstration of his historical learning, the lessons for the United States10
he saw in financial history, and his grasp of the components of a modern, articulated
financial system, and the support each component gives to the others. On the basis of the
limited historical evidence and other information available to him, Hamilton drew the
right conclusions. He also realized that in America public opinion, not just the views of
leaders, mattered for policy change. With that in mind, Hamilton in 1781-1782 published
six essays entitled The Continentalist in a New York newspaper. These essays were
simpler versions of the ideas embodied in his three letter-essays to leaders.
By the time Hamilton became Secretary of the Treasury a decade later, the plans
that he started to shape in 1779-1781 were more refined. In the interim, Robert Morris
appointed Hamilton receiver of Continental revenues for New York State, an experience
that provided lessons in the difficulties of financing a national government by means of
requisitions from states. As Congress’s Superintendent of Finance from 1781 to 1784,
Morris tried without success to implement many of the financial reforms that Hamilton
would successfully implement a decade later. It is one thing to have a plan, and quite
another to be able to execute it. Likely the different outcomes resulted from the
constitutional changes of 1787-1788. (Hamilton, as we have seen, called for such
changes in 1780.)
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In September 1789, shortly after approving Congress’s bill establishing the
Treasury Department, President Washington nominated Hamilton to head it, with
Congress approving the nomination the same day. Hamilton immediately arranged loans
from the Banks of North America and New York that financially launched the new
federal government. Revenues from recently enacted duties on imports and tonnage were
still absent, and one of Hamilton’s early tasks as Treasury Secretary was to organize the
system for collecting federal revenues.
Having developed his financial plan for the country over the course of the
previous decade, Hamilton now was in a position to execute it, with the help of his allies
in and out of Congress. That was not to prove so easy: each step of the implementation
featured political controversy; partisan attacks became increasingly bitter. As leaders
took positions in favor of or against Hamilton’s program, the U.S. financial revolution
4 Ver Steeg (1954) provides a full account of Morris’s financial program and its relationship to Hamilton’s.11
soon engendered the two-party system of politics that ever since has been a staple of
American life.
Despite the political divisions, the financial revolution happened, and with great
rapidity. By the time Hamilton retired as Treasury Secretary in 1795, the finances and
debt management of the new federal government would be firmly established, and the
U.S. economy would have a modern, articulated financial system jump-starting and
sustaining its growth.
II. Executing and Implementing the Plan
Ten days after becoming Secretary of the Treasury in 1789, Hamilton was
directed by the House of Representatives to prepare a plan “for the support of the public
credit, as a matter of high importance to the national honor and prosperity.” He delivered
his report in January 1790. On the basis of fairly solid information, Hamilton estimated
the debts of the United States, including arrears of interest, at $54.1 million, of which
$11.7 million was owed to foreign governments and investors, and $42.1 was owed to
domestic creditors. In addition, he estimated from less solid information that state debts
incurred mostly during the War of Independence, including arrears of interest, were $25
million. Because they had been incurred in the common cause, Hamilton argued that the
state debts ought to be assumed by the federal government. The grand total of the
national debt estimated by Hamilton amounted to $79.1 million (Syrett 1962, VI, 87-88),
about 40 percent of estimated GDP in 1790 (Johnston and Williamson 2009).
If the United States were pay interest on this mass of debt on the terms under
which it had been borrowed, Hamilton calculated that the annual expenses would come to
$4.587 million--$4.045 million on the domestic debt and $0.543 on the foreign debt.
Could the government, with tax revenues just beginning to trickle in, have paid this huge
annual interest expense along with its annual operating expenses, which he estimated at
$0.6 million?
5 Hamilton thought that to do so “would require the extension of taxation to
a degree, and to objects, which the true interest of public creditors forbids” (Syrett 1962,
VI, 88). Therefore, he recommended that interest on the foreign debt be paid in full, but
5 Hamilton was too optimistic with his $0.6 million estimate of federal operating expenses. In the
governments first full year of operation, 1790, domestic operating expenditures came to $0.829 million.12
that domestic debt holders voluntarily agree to have the full value of their debts funded
by a new loan at a reduced rate of interest amounting essentially to 4 percent instead of
the original 6 percent.
6 That would reduce the annual interest on the domestic debt to a
little over $2.7 million, potentially manageable, instead of $4 million.
To induce domestic creditors to make the voluntary conversion, Hamilton offered
call protection—only a small amount of the debt could be retired annually even if market
interest rates declined, as he confidently predicted they would. To give the creditors
further assurances, he proposed a federally administered sinking fund to apply surplus
revenues and money borrowed at home or abroad to open-market purchases of public
debt “until the whole of the debt shall be discharged” (Syrett 1962, VI, 107; Sylla and
Wilson 1999). Investors thus could count on the government not merely to pay interest on
its debt, but ultimately to redeem it. And the government gained the ability to conduct
open-market purchases to support debt prices.
After half a year of protracted debates in Congress and some side deals to attract
the needed votes, Congress essentially adopted Hamilton’s proposal. The most crucial of
the side deals involved federal assumption of state debts. As Thomas Jefferson, the
Secretary of State, reported on a 1790 conversation with Hamilton, “He [Hamilton]
opened the subject of the assumption of state debts, the necessity of it in the general fiscal
arrangements and it’s (sic) indispensible necessity toward a preservation of the union:
and particularly of the New England states, who had made great expenditures during the
war... [and who] would make it a sine qua non of a continuance of the Union” (cited by
Elkins and McKitrick 1993, 155). But most southern members of the House of
Representatives were opposed to assumption, and in early votes they had prevented it
from passing. At Hamilton’s behest, Jefferson hosted a dinner for Hamilton and Madison
in June, 1790, at which Madison, a member of the House from Virginia, agreed to twist
the arms of some southern Congressmen to switch their votes to favor assumption in
return for Hamilton arranging a move of the national capital from New York to a new
6 Hamilton in his January 1790 Report on Public Credit laid out a menu of debt management options for
Congress to consider. Congress adopted one of them with a minor modification that was more generous to
public creditors than Hamilton’s proposal. But it was also less generous because Congress reduced the rate
of interest the government would pay on the new debt representing arrears of interest to 3 percent, whereas
Hamilton had proposed that arrears receive the same interest rate as the original principal sums borrowed.
See Swanson and Trout 1992.13
capital city on the Potomac River (after a ten-year stay in Philadelphia to secure
Pennsylvania’s support for the deal). This is how Washington, D.C., came to be, and
how Hamilton obtained federal assumption of state debts (McDonald 1978, Chap. VIII;
Elkins and McKitrick 1993, Chap. III; see also the further discussion of assumption in
Section III below).
U.S. foreign debt, owed mostly to France, would be discharged by new foreign
loans, arranged primarily through Dutch bankers. This roll-over of the foreign debt was
completed by 1795. Interest on the domestic federal debt—the new loan took the form of
three new securities: a 6 percent bond (6s), a 3 percent bond (3s), and a 6 percent bond
with interest deferred (deferreds) for ten years, with public creditors receiving a package
of the three yielding 4 percent interest in exchange for the old debt—began to be paid
quarterly in 1791. Assumed state debts were funded by a similar exchange, but interest
payments were delayed until 1792, with interest accrued to 1792 being added to the
principal.
Exchanges of old debt for new debt went smoothly. By September 1791, $31.8 of
an eventual total of $64.5 million had been converted. From then to the end of 1793, and
additional $26.2 million was exchanged. By the end of 1794, a month before Hamilton
stepped down as Treasury Secretary, $63.1, or 98 percent of the total domestic debt, had
voluntarily been exchanged for the new 6s, 3s, and deferreds (Bayley 1884, 403).
Substantial increases in the market values of the three federal debt securities in the early
1790s aided the conversion process by confirming predictions Hamilton had made when
he unveiled his plan for supporting public credit.
Even with interest charges on domestic debt reduced from $4 to $2.7 million,
adding in the interest on the foreign debt ($0.5-0.6 million in 1790) raised projected total
annual interest to $3.2 million. Adding further to that amount a conservative estimate of
ordinary federal operating expenses of at least $0.8 million (see footnote 4), the annual
cost of Hamilton’s program adopted by Congress in 1790 would come to more than $4
million by 1792, when it became fully operational.
Where was the money to come from to cover $4 million or more of government
expenditures? In the early 1790s, Hamilton recommended some increases and extensions
of the import duties levied in the original tariff of 1789. He also persuaded Congress to14
enact some excise taxes. But rates of taxation were kept low. The purpose of the tariff
was revenue, not protection, and Hamilton knew that Americans detested taxes of any
kind. The key to the success of Hamilton’s bold gamble to establish public credit solidly
and quickly would not be tax increases. Instead, it would be a higher rate of economic
growth—rising American incomes would draw in more imports and swell customs
collections—plus an ability of the Treasury to borrow what was needed to cover
shortfalls of tax revenue that might arise before growth generated enough tax revenue to
pay the expenses of the federal government.
That is why two other financial foundations—the Bank of the United States and
the securities markets—were so important to Hamilton’s plan. As he had outlined to
Robert Morris nearly a decade before: a national bank would “increase public and private
credit,” with public credit giving “power to the state for the protection of its rights and
interests,” while private credit “facilitates and extends the operations of commerce among
individuals.” The Bank would be a source of loans to the government to cover revenue
shortfalls, and it would lend also to the private sector to extend commerce and facilitate
growth. Securities markets operated in a similar way: their existence increased the power
of the state to borrow by selling debt securities. At the same time securities markets
offered private investors liquidity and income, and provided corporate entrepreneurs with
a means of raising equity and debt capital. In Hamilton’s plan, visionary for its time, state
power and economic growth indeed went hand in hand. Each was needed for the other to
succeed.
In his January 1790 report, Hamilton asked Congress to ask him to prepare a
proposal for a national bank. Congress obliged in August. The Bank Report came in
December. Hamilton listed three principal advantages of the Bank, the first of which
emphasized its contributions to economic growth. Bank lending to business would create
bank or credit money in the form of bank notes and deposits, augmenting the money
supply, and “thus by contributing to enlarge the mass of industrious and commercial
enterprise, banks become the nurseries of national wealth....” The second and third
advantages were governmental: the Bank would be a source of loans to the government,
“especially in sudden emergencies,” and it would facilitate the payment of taxes, both by15
lending to those who owed taxes and by increasing “the quantity of circulating medium
and the quickening of the circulation” (Syrett 1963, VII, 309).
The Bank of the United States, as proposed by Hamilton, was to be a private
corporation chartered by Congress, to avoid “a calamitous abuse of it” when “temptations
of momentary exigencies” might lead to inflationary excesses “should the credit of the
Bank be at the disposal of the Government” (Syrett 1963, VII, 331). Here Hamilton
espoused what later would be called central bank independence. But he called for the
U.S. government to own 20 percent of the Bank’s $10 million of capital stock, to be
purchased initially by a loan from the Bank and repaid over ten years, and for the
government to have some oversight of it. So it was really a mixed private-public
corporation, but one whose levers Hamilton could employ in central banking operations.
Private investors owning the majority of the Bank’s stock could pay for one-
fourth in specie and three-fourths in the recently issued U.S. 6s. The latter provision
increased the demand for 6s, market prices of which rose to par. So the Bank supported
the public debt, just as the debt supported the Bank.
The Bank would also be allowed to open branches, although Hamilton thought it
advisable to wait until the institution was firmly established in one place, and the
managerial issues posed by a branch bank were well understood, before it opened
branches. He saw the advantages of a large, well-managed branch bank as being greater
lending capacity and less danger of bank runs. In the Bank Report Hamilton formalized
the above-mentioned provisions and others into twenty-four articles of a proposed
constitution, which became the basis for the Bank’s charter enacted by both houses of
Congress in January and February 1791.
That was not quite the end of the story. The president had to approve the Bank
bill, and Washington hesitated when three of his trusted advisors, Madison in Congress,
and Jefferson and Randolph in the cabinet, argued that the Bank was not authorized by
the Constitution. Hamilton effectively countered their argument in a defense of the Bank
that set forth the doctrine of implied constitutional powers. Washington signed the bill.
But Hamilton’s victory may have been part of a complex deal to approve the Bank while
assuring the southerners who had tactically opposed it that the national capital, as earlier
agreed, would move to the Potomac by 1800 (McDonald 1979, 199-210).16
The Bank had its public offering of stock, heavily oversubscribed, in July 1791,
and it opened in Philadelphia in December. Several branches—New York, Boston,
Baltimore, and Charleston—opened in 1792. By its model and its expanding presence,
the Bank prompted states to charter more banks of their own, ensuring a rapid expansion
of the U.S. banking system. Some states such as New York did this for defensive
reasons; they feared that if they did not charter state banks, the federal bank’s branches
would dominate banking in those states. Other states such as Rhode Island chartered a
bank for just the opposite reason; they thought it would help attract a branch of the
federal bank (Sylla 1998, 2008). The three state banks existing in 1790 thus became 20
by 1795, and 28 by 1800. These state banks interacted with one another and with the five
branches of the Bank of the United States in a rapidly developing nationwide banking
network.
U.S. securities markets also expanded rapidly as a result of Hamilton’s program.
How could they not? The debt restructuring created more than $60 million (par value) of
new U.S. 6s, 3s, and deferreds, while the Bank added $10 million of equity shares (par
$400 per share) between 1790 and 1794. Markets, even nascent stock exchanges, for all
these new securities began actively to trade the new federal securities and Bank stock in
several cities—Philadelphia, New York, and Boston in 1790, followed closely by
Charleston and Baltimore—almost as soon as they appeared (Sylla 1998, Wright 2002,
2008). These markets also facilitated the finances of state governments, which owned
securities paying interest and dividends. Banks and other business corporations, which
the states increasingly chartered, raised capital by issuing securities, and like state
governments some of the corporations earned income by investing in securities.
Financial development unleashed by Hamilton’s financial revolution apparently
raised the rate of growth of the U.S. economy to modern levels in the early 1790s, as was
intended (see section IV). And it is a good thing that it did because increased growth was
the key to solving rather pressing financial problems that Hamilton’s program created for
the government. Recall that the federal government needed to finance at least $4 million
of spending by 1792, that is, $3.2 million of interest payments on its debt and at least
$0.8 million in operating expenses. It was able to do this, which led later scholars of the
era to assume it was not much of a problem at all. For example, Elkins and McKitrick17
(1993, 226) contend that after Congress enacted excises Hamilton proposed in early
1791,
[T]he first phase of Hamilton’s financial program was complete. The federal
government now had an income sufficient to cover current expenses and to pay
full interest on the entire debt. This meant that the tax potential which had long
impressed European financiers was no longer a projection but a fact, and as
Hamilton’s predictions about the Treasury’s ability to meet its obligations without
undue strain were borne out, the price of federal securities would continue to
move toward par. They would thus be less and less viewed as an item for
speculation.
While Hamilton certainly wanted people at the time to think that federal finances were
fundamentally sound—that was part of his strategy—he should not be allowed to keep
scholars two centuries later under that illusion.
7 He did give a number of hints as to the
direness of fiscal outlook around the time he came into office. Writing in October 1789
to Lafayette in France, Hamilton asked if France could delay payments of the debt the
United States owed to it, and make it look as though it was a French idea: “I venture to
say to you, as my friend, that if the installments of the Principal of the debt could be
suspended for a few years, it would be a valuable accommodation to the United States….
Could an arrangement of this sort meet the approbation of your Government, it would be
best on every account that the offer should come unsolicited as a fresh mark of good will”
Syrett, V, 426). A day later he communicated the same ideas to William Short, an
American representative in Europe, implying that Short should hint to France that “a
voluntary and unsolicited offer” to delay debt payments would be most welcome (Syrett,
V, 429-30).
7 About the only one who did not succumb to the illusion of fiscal soundness in the early 1790s was Riley,
who noted that in 1792, “interest payments on the American debt amounted to $3.2 million, a figure
equivalent to 87 percent of tax revenues totaling $3.67 million. Debt charges including redemptions
equaled no less than $7.26 million, or 198 percent of tax revenues…. [S]uch ratios … exceeded current
levels among even fiscally straitened European governments” Further, “When one strikes a balance on the
liquid and potential assets and liabilities of the federal government in the years to 1796, one must
acknowledge the calculation points to insolvency’ (Riley 1980, 188-91).18
The closest Hamilton came to revealing the unpromising fiscal outlook in a public
document is in the January 1790 Report on Public Credit. After noting that the annual
interest on the public debt, domestic and foreign, according to the original terms of
borrowing would be $4.6 million, Hamilton goes on:
The interesting problem now occurs. Is it in the power of the United
States, consistently with those prudential considerations, which ought not to be
overlooked, to make a provision equal to the purpose of funding the whole debt,
at the rates of interest which it now bears, in addition to the sum which will be
necessary for the current service of the government.
The Secretary will not say that such provision would exceed the abilities
of the country; but he is clearly of the opinion, that to make it, would require the
extension of taxation to a degree, and to objects, which the true interest of the
public creditors forbids. It is therefore to be hoped, and even to be expected, that
they will cheerfully concur in such modifications of their claims, on fair and
equitable principles, as will facilitate to the government an arrangement
substantial, durable and satisfactory to the community (Syrett, VI, 87).
Hamilton here is saying, in other words, that public creditors, in their own long-term
interest and in that of the country, should be willing to accept what later would be called
a “haircut,” a reduction of what they were contractually owed, because the government
did not have sufficient funds to pay all of what it owed, and if it tried to obtain the funds
by raising taxation the result could easily be a taxpayers’ revolt that ended up in their
getting even less than Hamilton was prepared to offer. The haircut did not reflect a write-
down of debt principal, which was fully funded. Rather, by reducing the interest paid on
the new debt in effect from 6 to 4 percent, Hamilton’s restructuring of the national debt
gave investors a package of securities that had a lower market value than it would have
had if 6 percent had been paid on all of it (Garber 1991).
Less than three months later, on March 29, 1790, Hamilton formally wrote to
President Washington that the Treasury did not have enough money to pay the members
of Congress and their staffs, the salaries of other government officials, the requirements
of the War Department, and an interest payment in arrears on Dutch loans. It therefore19
needed to obtain a loan of $100 thousand. Two days later, the President authorized the
loan (Syrett, VI, 328, 333). The new government of the United States was living from
hand to mouth.
Just how tenuous was the fiscal situation of the federal government in the early
1790s, and just how much Hamilton counted on economic growth to change that situation
is evident in the following table, which shows federal revenues from sources other than
loans growing year by year from 1789 to 1800.
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Table 2.1. Federal Tax Revenues by Year, 1789-1800
Year Revenue (000) Year Revenue (000)
1789 162 1795 6,115
1790 1,640 1796 8,378
1791 2,648 1797 8,689
1792 3,675 1798 7,900
1793 4,653 1799 7,547
1794 5,432 1800 10,849
Sources: 1789-1793: Van Eeghen Papers, Archives of the University of Amsterdam;
1794-1800: Historical Statistics of the United States (2006, 5-80).
Revenues (excluding loans) grew 3.3-fold from 1790, the first full year of revenue
collection, to 1795, or 26 percent per year. Most of this revenue (100 percent in 1790, 91
percent in 1795) was from duties on imports and tonnage. Although some duties were
added (as were excises, which raised $209 thousand in 1792, their first year, and $338
thousand in 1795), and other duties were increased, these innovations cannot account for
the entire revenue upsurge. Nor can the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in
8 Scholars may have been fooled by a quirk in virtually all reports of federal fiscal data, which lump the
years 1789-1791 together seemingly as one year. The table here is based on quarterly and half yearly
financial reports from 1789 through 1793 that I discovered in the Van Eeghen documentary collection of
early Americana, located in the archives of the University of Amsterdam. Dutch investors in America such
as the Van Eeghens, as a part of their due diligence, gathered whatever intelligence they could obtain in the
United States and sent it back to the Netherlands to be pasted in scrapbooks for future reference. Van
Eeghen & Co. in the later nineteenth century donated their scrapbooks to the university. The quarterly and
half yearly statements of federal revenues and expenses are printed sheets that I surmise were created by
the Treasury for the information of Congress at the time. In the United States they do not appear to exist,
probably because they were regarded as ephemera that could be discarded after more up-to-date statements
appeared. The Dutch did Americans a favor by preserving a part of early U.S. financial history that
apparently was not preserved in America.20
1793, often cited as an unexpected source of prosperity for the United States, since the
most rapid gains in revenue were from 1789 to 1793.
It is therefore difficult to avoid a conclusion that the upsurge in revenue was due
in good part to a higher real rate of economic growth along with a rising price level that
resulted from monetary expansion rooted in both domestic (bank expansion) and foreign
(capital inflows as foreign investors purchased American securities) sources (Rousseau
and Sylla 2005; Rousseau in this volume). A part of the growth resulted from expanding
exports (Goldin and Lewis 1980). More rapid growth also led to more taxable imports,
which is why expanding trade was an essential ingredient of Hamilton’s fiscal planning
(Irwin in this volume).
As happened often in later U.S. history, economic growth ratified the risky bets
on the future of entrepreneurs. In the early 1790s, the main entrepreneur was the
Secretary of the Treasury, who bet that his comprehensive program of financial
innovation and reform would jump-start economic growth and make it possible for the
federal government to pay much more interest on its debt than seemed possible when the
decisions were made to make those payments in 1790. Hamilton won his bet, but it was
by no means the easy win historians often assume it was. Hindsight is 20-20, but a look
at the government’s finances during 1790-1792, when the future was unknown, indicates
that some good things had to happen for Hamilton’s bold debt-funding gamble to
succeed.
III. The Financial Policy Debate of the 1790s
There was a high-level financial policy debate of sorts in the mid 1790s. On one
side was Albert Gallatin, a Republican congressman from western Pennsylvania and
future Treasury Secretary in the Jefferson and Madison administrations. Gallatin was the
Republican opposition’s financial expert, a role that corresponded to Hamilton’s role in
the Federalist Party. The two parties had formed either to support Hamilton’s financial
policies or to oppose them, although both had precursors in the Federalist vs. Anti-
Federalist debates over the Constitution. Gallatin in 1796 presented his reasoned critique
of Federalist financial policies along with extensive data drawn from government
documents in A Sketch of the Finances of the United States (Adams 1960, III, 69-206).21
Although Gallatin most likely was unaware of it, Hamilton essentially responded
to Gallatin’s critique before Gallatin wrote and published it. In a lengthy but never
completed essay, “The Defence of the Funding System,” dated July 1795, six months
after stepping down as Treasury Secretary, Hamilton reviewed the decisions he had made
while in office and the reasons he had made them (Syrett 1973, XIX, 1-73). The two
essays deal with the same issues—taxes and spending, public debt management, the
Bank, securities markets, the economic and political effects of the measures adopted. We
therefore can read them as a policy debate, even though the two debaters were not on a
platform confronting one another. Gallatin’s is the more polished of the two, but
Hamilton’s rough draft is the more penetrating because he had made the key policy
decisions, and he used “The Defence” to explain them in considerable detail.
Like other Republican leaders, Gallatin thought most public debts were bad, and
his principal charge against Hamilton’s policies was that the assumption of state debts in
1790 had made the national debt larger than it needed to be by at least $10.9 million.
Most state debts, $18.3 million, were assumed in 1790, and each state’s debt assumed by
the federal government was charged to it in a settlement of state accounts to equalize
across states the per capita costs of financing the War of Independence. The settlement
of state accounts was not completed until a few years after 1790. When it was
completed, creditor states—ones that had contributed more than their fair shares of the
war costs—were found to be owed $3.5 million. The debtor states that had contributed
less than their fair shares had an equivalent negative balance. Creditor states were issued
some $4 million in new federal bonds to cover the $3.5 million in their favor plus arrears
of interest. That swelled the amount of state debt assumed to $22.5 million. The debtor
states for political reasons were forgiven the corresponding balances they owed.
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With elaborate arithmetical calculations, Gallatin demonstrated that if assumption
had been postponed until the settlement of accounts had occurred, the states could have
been put in exactly the same position as they were with a federal assumption of only
$11.6 million. Hence the national debt was $10.9 million larger than it needed to be. So
why was the federal assumption of state debts done in 1790 instead of waiting until the
9 Perkins (1994, Chapter 9) provides a good treatment of how the settlement of state accounts took place in
the early 1790s.22
settlement of state accounts had been completed? Gallatin listed the ostensible reasons
as, first, some states were heavily burdened by their debts in 1790 and could not
realistically wait for a final settlement to occur, if indeed they could be sure it would ever
occur; second, the new federal government would be strengthened if more state creditors
depended on it for debt payments; and third, it might be easier for the federal government
to pay the debts. Gallatin’s own view was darker. The additional debt had weakened, not
strengthened, the union and had rendered additional taxes necessary. He also suspected
that “some influential characters [most likely including Hamilton] whose wish was to
increase and perpetuate the debt,” had pushed for a quick assumption, possibly to foster
“private interest and speculation” (Adams 1960, III, 131).
In “The Defence,” Hamilton essentially agreed with the ostensible reasons for
assumption as set forth by Gallatin. Some states were heavily burdened with debts in
1790, and were not in a position to wait for a final settlement accounts that possibly
might never occur. If those states had to resort to higher taxes to service their debts, the
result might be more taxpayer revolts such as Shays’ rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786.
If that did not happen, Hamilton thought that higher taxes in the heavily indebted states
would promote emigration from them to lightly taxed states, making the debt burden yet
more difficult to bear. Hamilton also agreed with Gallatin that assumption tended “to
strengthen our infant Government by increasing the number of ligaments between the
Government and the interests of Individuals,” but that “this was the consideration upon
which I relied least of all” (Syrett 1973, XIX, 39-41). Why? The tendency of having
more domestic creditors to give support to the federal government was offset by the
necessity of resorting to unpalatable modes of taxation that “jeopardized [the
government’s] popularity and gave a handle to its enemies to attack.” And in any event
the increased ligaments between the federal government and domestic creditors would be
temporary as foreign investors purchased more of the debt and as the debt was gradually
paid down, both of which Hamilton expected to happen.
Hamilton also agreed with Gallatin’s point that the federal government, having
sole access to customs and tonnage duties, could more easily pay debts. But his strongest
reason for favoring assumption in 1790 was that he feared conflicts over tax bases
between state and federal governments if both had large debts to service. The23
Constitution had given the states and the federal government concurrent powers over all
tax bases except imports, a plan that involved “inherent and great difficulties” even
though it was a better plan than the alternatives. Hamilton saw these difficulties as “the
Gordian knot of our political situation.”
To me there appeared but one way of untying or severing it, which was in practice
to leave the states under as little necessity as possible of exercising the power of
taxation. The narrowness of the limits of its exercise on one side left the field
more free and unembarrassed to the other and avoided essentially the interference
and collisions to be apprehended inherent in the plan of concurrent jurisdiction
(Syrett 1973, XIX, 23).
If the state debts had not been assumed, Hamilton wrote, the United States as a
nation and all public creditors would have been subject to “the weakness and
embarrassment incident to fifteen or perhaps to 50 different systems of finance” (Syrett,
XIX, 25). His assumption plan, in contrast, had three advantages: it lightened the
burdens of all citizens; it equalized the burdens of the citizens of one state with those of
another; and it brought immediate relief to the states with the heaviest debt burdens while
facilitating the eventual settlement of state accounts. “It is curious fact which has not
made its due impression,” Hamilton wrote in 1795, “that in every state the people have
found relief from assumption while an incomparably better provision than before existed
has been made for the state debts” (Syrett XIX, 35).
Recent research on state taxation during the 1780s and 1790s confirms
Hamilton’s point: “[S]tate governments were relieved of both payments on Congress’s
requisitions and on their own state debts. Freed from these expenses, the state
governments could reduce direct taxation by as much as 75 to 90 percent” (Edling and
Kaplanoff 2004, 736). The federal government was able to relieve the states from the
necessity of raising taxes, indeed to allow them substantially to lower taxes, without
resorting to direct taxes such as the property and poll taxes that were the mainstays of
state revenues. The fear that the federal government would resort to direct taxes—
Hamilton’s Gordian Knot of concurrent federal and state tax bases—led to the
Constitution’s stricture that federal direct taxation had to be apportioned to the states on24
the basis of population. Still, the fear that the federal government might tax citizens in a
direct way persisted into the ratification debates and beyond.
Since Hamilton believed that there was one national debt that had been incurred
in the common cause of independence, he scoffed at the notion Gallatin at least came
close to promoting, namely that the debt had been increased by assumption: “Assumption
did nothing more than transfer the particular debts to the Union…. The MASS OF
PUBLIC DEBT remained the same, on the infallible evidence of a mathematical axiom
that WHOLE cannot be greater that ITS PARTS” (Syrett XIX, 44).
A minor aspect of Gallatin’s critique of Treasury Department management is
interesting in the light of recent research findings. Gallatin in his close perusal of the
Treasury’s accounts had noticed that expenditures on debt reduction were made by the
sinking fund in 1791 and 1792, and later repaid from the proceeds of foreign loans
arranged by Dutch bankers before the foreign loans had been received in the Treasury.
He charged that “the transaction was illegal, but no otherwise criminal than as it was
illegal.” But he then went on to say, “…the result of the purchases made at that period
was useful by accelerating the raising of the price of stock to its nominal value” (Adams
1960, III, 110-12).
What Gallatin apparently did not know, in part because Hamilton had not wanted
it to be widely known, was that the Dutch funds were used to repay domestic bank loans
incurred to finance Hamilton’s open market purchases of government securities during
two financial crises—the collapse of the Bank scrip bubble in August and September
1791, and the collapse of securities prices in the financial panic of March and April of
1792 when panicked selling caused market prices of U.S. debt securities to fall 25 percent
in two weeks. Well aware of the collapses of French Mississippi and the British South
Sea bubbles in 1720, Hamilton knew that financial modernization carried with it an
increased probability of financial crises. He had given some thought to how a finance
minister or central banker ought to react such crises. When the 1791 and 1792 crises
broke out, Hamilton fought them in modern ways by making open market purchases of
securities, fostering banker-dealer cooperative agreements to increase market liquidity,
and encouraging banks to keep lending (Sylla, Wright, and Cowen 2009).25
Gallatin certainly knew about and mentioned the 1792 crisis, but he did not make
the connection it had with the financial operations of the Treasury (Adams 1960, III, 134-
35). The 1791 and 1792 financial crises ended quickly as a result of Hamilton’s actions,
with seeming little or no disruption of the economic expansion taking place at the time.
But the Republican opposition had a field day, claiming that Hamilton’s policies were
turning the country into a nation of stock-jobbers and speculators, and that Hamilton
abetted speculative activity by illegally committing the proceeds of foreign loans before
they had been received. When his enemies in Congress, including Gallatin, questioned
the financial transactions, Hamilton coyly responded that the expenditures were for
reducing the public debt, which everyone would agree was a good thing. He did not
mention that the Treasury’s purchases of U.S. debt helped to bail out the banks, brokers,
and dealers of Wall Street and Chestnut Street during two financial meltdowns. After the
crisis wound down, in May 1792 a number of the securities dealers Hamilton had bailed
out joined with others in the Buttonwood Agreement that marked the founding of the
New York Stock Exchange and a better trading system for securities (Sylla 2005; Sylla,
Wright, and Cowen 2009).
Gallatin, contrary to the views of many in his Republican party, agreed with
Hamilton that the Bank of the United States, as well as banks in general, were useful for
making loans to the government as well as to the private sector. As Treasury Secretary,
he would later argue unsuccessfully for the Bank to be re-chartered in 1811. But he felt
that Federalist administration had abused the Bank by borrowing too much from it
instead of reducing expenditures and raising taxes. The heavy borrowing from the Bank,
Gallatin contended, had created an apprehension that it “might become a political engine
in the hands of the government,” and also reinforced the conviction among many (mostly
in his Republican party) that Congress did not by the Constitution have a right to
incorporate such an institution (Adams 1960, III, 135-36).
Hamilton earlier had addressed both of these issues, in the Bank report and in his
lawyerly opinion that the Bank’s did not violate the Constitution. But once he had
decided to fund all federal and state debts at par, revenue shortfalls gave him no choice
other than to borrow a lot from the Bank, which is why he fought so hard for its
establishment. By 1796, as Gallatin noted, the government had borrowed $6 million, 6026
percent of the institution’s capital, and the Bank asked for much of it to be repaid.
Wolcott, Hamilton’s successor, against his own and Hamilton’s wishes, was forced to sell
nearly half of the government’s shares in the Bank to pay down the loans (Cowen 2000,
215). This weakened the ties between the government and the national bank, probably
making it easier for anti-Bank forces to prevail when the Bank’s charter came up for
renewal in 1811.
Gallatin closed his Sketch with a challenge to the view that the debt funding plan
“had created a large productive capital which did not exist before.” His view was that
“every nation is enfeebled by a public debt,” and that the best policy was to extinguish
public debt as quickly as it was feasible to do so by cutting spending and increasing
taxes. He lamented the fact that foreign investors had purchased so much of the U.S.
debt and other American securities, which only led the American sellers “to consume, to
spend more, and they have consumed and spent extravagantly.”
Taking in the great number of elegant houses which have been built within a few
years in all the large cities, and which, however convenient to the inhabitants,
afford no additional revenue to the nation, it may be asserted that the greater part
of the capital thus drawn from Europe for purchases of stock has been actually
consumed, without leaving in its stead any other productive capital, and thus as
the nation still owes the whole, it has been impoverished even by the only
consequence of the funding system that has made any temporary addition to the
apparent wealth of the country. That wealth is, in a great degree, consumed and
destroyed, and the whole debt remains to be paid (Adams 1960, III, 149).
Substitute China for Europe in this passage, and Gallatin’s message would seem rather
similar to arguments one often hears today, more than two centuries later. Other passages
in his essay indicate that he would subscribe to “crowding out”—the idea that public
borrowing and spending reduces private investment—as well as Ricardian equivalence—
the notion that people react to increases in public debt by increasing their savings in order
to be able to pay the increased taxes necessary to service a larger public debt.27
The solution to the problem, Gallatin argued in a way that foreshadowed
Jefferson’s and his policies as Treasury Secretary after 1800, was to get rid of the debt as
quickly as possible. One way of doing that would be to sell land to pay down the debt.
Another would be to exchange public land for debt. But even if that were done, there
would still be a need for more revenue, as the Treasury had converted the 6 percent debt
to 8 percent annuities in the mid 1790s in a plan drawn up by Hamilton and implemented
by Wolcott, which raised the annual cost of servicing the debt. And the deferred 6
percent component of the debt would commence paying interest in 1801. Tax increases
were therefore necessary. But, Gallatin wrote, customs duties were already as high as
they should be, and excises were disliked and had a low revenue potential. Therefore,
“the other general species of American capital, the other great branch of national revenue,
lands, must be resorted to; must be made to contribute by direct taxation (Adams 1960,
III, 168). Gallatin, in short, called for a national property tax. Whereas Hamilton had
severed the Gordian Knot of concurrent federal and state tax bases, Gallatin
recommended that it be retied.
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Hamilton disagreed with most of Gallatin’s analysis. Sales of American securities
to foreign investors, far from encouraging lavish consumption, brought in capital that
made the U.S. economy grow faster:
Whoever will impartially look around will see that the great body of the new
Capital created by the Stock has been employed in extending commerce,
agriculture, manufactures, and other improvements. Our own real navigation has
been much increased. Our external commerce is carried on much more upon our
own capitals than it was…. Settlements of our waste land are progressing with
more vigour than at any former period. Our Cities and Towns are increasing
rapidly by the addition of new and better houses. Canals are opening, bridges are
10 In 1798, the federal government, suffering from reduced customs collections as a result of French
predations on U.S. international commerce and a lack of access to European capital because the
Amsterdam market had been cut off after the French revolutionaries overran the Dutch Republic, imposed a
direct tax during the Quasi War with France. It did so again during the War of 1812 with Great Britain.
The two direct taxes were highly unpopular and politically divisive, as Hamilton had surmise they would
be.28
building with more spirit & effect than was ever known at a former period. The
value of lands has risen everywhere.
These circumstances (though other causes may have cooperated)…are
imputable in a great degree to the increase of Capital in public Debt and they
prove that the predictions of its dissipation in luxurious extravagance have not
been verified…. The universal vivification of the energies of industry has laid the
foundations of benefits far greater than the interest to be paid to foreigners can
counterbalance as a disadvantage (Syrett 1973, 65-66).
For Hamilton, public debt was indeed a blessing. Since it was traded in the markets of
Europe, it was relatively easy for Europeans threatened by wars to emigrate to America
and bring their capital with them. All they had to do was to purchase the U.S. stock in
European markets, and easily convert it to cash on arrival in America by utilizing U.S.
securities markets. Americans enjoyed a similar advantage from liquid securities
markets: “All property is capital,” wrote Hamilton, and “that which can quickly and at all
times be converted to money is active capital. It is nearly the same thing as if the
possessor had an equal sum of money on hand” (Syrett 1973, 67).
11 In fact, owners of
government debt used it as collateral for bank loans; by 1792 the 6 percent debt was
accepted at par value as collateral for such loans (Sylla 1998).
It was a great policy debate between the top financial and economic experts of the
two contending political parties of the 1790s. Gallatin and Hamilton were not directly
addressing one another, but one would hardly know that.
IV. Growth
So who won the debate? Gallatin with his view that Federalist financial policies
had saddled the country with excessive debt that was enfeebling it, with the only
solutions being to cut spending, impose a national property tax, and extinguish the debt?
Or Hamilton, who viewed his planned financial revolution as having the salutary effects
on public credit, state power, and economic growth that he long had predicted they would
have?
11 On the early integration of U.S. and European securities market, see Sylla, Wilson, and Wright (2006).29
It is the nature of such policy debates that the winners and losers cannot be known
at the time they take place. The debate is about the future, not known at the time and
only revealed by the passage of time and the march of events. There were neither GDP
and industrial production data nor stock market indices in the 1790s, so Gallatin and
Hamilton could not use such data to score debating points. Gallatin in 1796, however,
did not counter the optimistic view that Hamilton and others took of the U.S. economy’s
progress. Rather, in general terms, he endorsed it: “[I]n proportion to our population, we
[are] one of the first commercial nations … we are by far the first agricultural nation
…[but] we are not yet a manufacturing nation” (Adams 1960, III, 168). The country had
too much debt, however, and the blame for that, Gallatin implied without naming names,
could be laid at Hamilton’s doorstep.
Various analyses, data sets, and estimations of GDP and its components
developed much later to describe early U.S. economic growth, tenuous as they are and
not always agreeing with one another, tend to support Hamilton’s optimistic view of the
economic changes taking place. North (1961, 53) relying heavily on balance of payments
data, called the period 1793-1808 “years of unparalleled prosperity.” He traced the
prosperity to Hamilton’s policies and the trade boom in neutral America created by
European wars. The latter was a temporary factor that went away after Jefferson’s
embargo in 1808. Goldin and Lewis (1980), also relying on international trade data,
estimated U.S. real per capita income growth in the range of 1.03 to 1.51 percent per year
from 1793 to 1800, and in the range of 0.84 to 1.32 percent per year from 1793 to 1807.
Several attempts have been made to estimate U.S. GDP (total and per capita,
nominal and inflation-adjusted) annually, back to 1790. These estimates rely on modern-
type GDP series that begin for years around 1840, benchmark GDP estimates between
1790 and 1840, interpolations between benchmark years using annual series that relate to
components of GDP, and assumptions about the relationship of non-agricultural
productivity (about which little is known, especially before 1820) to agricultural
productivity (about which more is taken to be known).
12 The three real GDP per capita
series in Carter et al. (2006, Table Ca9-19, p. 3-23ff.) all indicate rapid growth at modern
12 See Carter et al. 2006, vol. 3, 3-16 to 3-19, for a good discussion of the problems of estimating annual
GDP series in the “Statistical Dark Age: 1790-1840.” The various series follow in Table Ca-19 starting on
3-23.30
rates ranging from about 1 to 3 percent per year from 1790 into the first years of the
nineteenth century, and considerably slower growth from then until around 1820. Indeed,
two of the series (Ca11 and Ca16) show almost no growth of per capita GDP in these two
decades, but the text discussing these series indicates that this is based on the assumption
that non-agricultural productivity experienced no growth because that is what agricultural
productivity did. Still a third series (Ca17, the Berry series) indicates per capita growth
of about 1 percent per year from a peak in 1801 to a peak in 1822. An accompanying
series (Ca19) on industrial production, one of the components of non-agricultural
production, grows at 5.4 percent per year from 1790 to 1802, and at 3.7 percent per year
for the next two decades; these rates are well above the rate of population growth, which
was just under 3 percent per year. This raises doubts about the assumption that non-
agricultural productivity did not grow.
An updated version of series Ca16 in Carter et al. (2006) is that of Johnston and
Williamson (2009) indicates rapid growth in real GDP per capita of 2.72 percent per year
from 1790 to an 1802 peak, slower but still modern growth of 0.85 percent per year from
1802 to 1814 (peak to peak), and then essentially no growth in the decade after 1814.
13
Overall, this series, which can be said to make use of the latest information relevant to
GDP estimation, shows per capita real GDP growing at a rate of 1.27 percent per year
during the three decades 1790-1820. The rapid economic growth of the 1790-1802 might
be confirmed, or at least supported, by a recently compiled stock market index extending
back to 1791, which claims to have discovered America’s first bull market, 1791-1803,
when US equity prices rose 47 percent (Taylor 2009).
14
Although the various estimates of historical GDP do not entirely agree on the
precise rates of early U.S. growth, they do agree that the rates from the 1790s onward
were “modern,” that is, in the vicinity of 1 percent or more per capita in real terms. They
also agree that there was a tendency of U.S. growth to accelerate gradually over time, as
one might expect if an initially small but rapidly growing modern sector—the
13 U.S. GDP and other macroeconomic data from 1790 to 2007, updated annually, are from Johnston and
Williamson (2009), at http://www.measuringworth.com/growth, a site that also features graphing
capabilities and a calculator allowing computation of growth rates between any two years.
14 The 12-stock index is not adjusted for inflation, which was some 3 percent per year in the 1790s, and it
shows price appreciation, not dividends. No doubt it will be extended and refined to show real appreciation
and real returns. The index, series SPXD, is available from http://www.globalfinancialdata.com.31
commercial and industrial activities that most utilized bank credit and capital markets—
gradually became a larger and larger component of the entire economy. By extension,
they also agree that the United States was growing considerably faster than the economy
of Great Britain, which from all the discussions of the first industrial revolution one
might have thought would have been the fastest growing economy. In fact, what some
regard as the best estimates of British growth (output per person) also show a gradual
acceleration, but it was from a rate of 0.35 percent a year during 1781-1801 to 0.52
percent a year during 1801-1831 (Crafts 1987; Sylla 2009). If these estimates are
accurate, the celebrated first industrial revolution in its early decades had a fairly muted
impact on average British incomes. And it appears that British growth during the first
industrial revolution was at roughly half the rate of growth of the U.S. economy during
the same era.
Gallatin and Hamilton agreed that there was considerable prosperity in the United
States at the time of the Gallatin-Hamilton debate. But would it last? Did it mark the
beginning of modern economic growth, the sustained growth that lasted for decades and
centuries? We now know that it did. GDP per capita grew at long-term rates of about 1
percent or more per year from 1790 to 1860, with little variation among sub-periods of
any length. By 1860, thanks to its rapid growth, the United States had a larger GDP than
the U.K., the mother country and the workshop of the world, and (although this is more
controversial) essentially the same GDP per capita according to Officer and Williamson
(2009).
Did U.S. policies, including those that produced the financial revolution of the
1790s, make the country grow faster than its neighbors and other “new” countries? The
evidence to answer this question is limited. But what there is suggests an answer of
“yes.” Angus Maddison’s estimates for benchmark dates of 1700 and 1820 indicate that
in 1700 Mexico’s GDP per capita was 107 percent of the U.S. (colonial) level; in 1820, it
was 60 percent of the U.S. level. Maddison also reports similar data for “other Western
offshoots” besides the United States, with that category including Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand. In 1700, these other offshoots (dominated by Canada, as Westerners had
yet to settle Australia and New Zealand) had GDP per capita that was 76 percent of the
level Maddison estimated for the colonial United States; by 1820, the other offshoots32
were only 60 percent of the U.S. level (Maddison 2001, Table B-21, 264).
15 The faster
growth of the early United States in comparison to the growth of its northern and
southern neighbors and other “new” countries suggests that U.S. policies launched in the
1790s did make a difference in relative economic performance.
V. Conclusion
What were the alternatives to Hamilton’s public credit, banking, and capital
market policies? As regards public credit, the two alternatives discussed at the time were
to give debt holders a worse deal than Hamilton did by repudiating some of the debt on
grounds of financial exigency, or to retire the debt rapidly by raising taxes—at both the
state and federal levels with no federal assumption of state debts, or at the federal level
with assumption. The former, repudiation, was never a serious option as it violated most
leaders’ sense of honor and would have made future borrowing capability problematic.
Rapid debt retirement by means of raising taxes was tried by Massachusetts in the 1780s,
and led to Shays’s Rebellion. That enhanced the appeal of Hamilton’s approach, which
involved funding the entire debt at a reduced rate of interest with a blend of new and
liquid federal securities (6 percents, 6 percent deferreds, and 3 percents), along with a
gradualist approach to debt retirement based on economic growth increasing federal tax
revenues as the U.S. population and economy expanded (Perkins 1993, chaps. 7-10).
Federal assumption of state debts was a closer call, and succeeded only by means
of linking it to other issues such as the location of the country’s temporary and permanent
capital cities. Without assumption, as Hamilton argued in his 1796 “Defence of the
Funding System” (Syrett, XIX, 1-73), the United States would have had 1) multiple
systems of state and federal public finance, 2) weaker governments and capital markets,
and 3) greater conflicts between heavily and lightly debt-burdened states that might have
threatened to break up the Union. With assumption, those problems went away and the
burdens on state public finance were greatly reduced. Eventually, the ability of the states
to borrow on their own for internal improvements and other purposes was greatly
15 For Canada, Maddison does not have a separate number for 1700, but for 1820, he reports one. It
indicates that Canada then had a GDP per capita that was 71 percent of the U.S. level. See Maddison 2001,
Table TA1-c, 185.33
enhanced as the pristine public credit of the federal government and the well-functioning
securities markets engendered by Hamilton’s policies rubbed off on them.
The alternative to the Bank of the United States was, of course, no central bank.
One need not speculate on the alternative because subsequent U.S. history gives
examples. Congress allowed the first Bank to lapse in 1811 when its twenty-year charter
expired and was not renewed. That added to the financial embarrassments of the federal
government during the War of 1812, as well as economic instability. Both paved the way
for Congress in 1816 to re-establish a central bank in the form a new and larger second
Bank of the United States, again with a twenty-year charter. Under the leadership of
Nicholas Biddle after 1823, the second Bank and the U.S. economy thrived. When
Congress voted to renew the Bank’s charter in 1832, President Andrew Jackson vetoed
the renewal and prevailed. That left the United States without a central bank from 1836
to 1914.
The absence of a central bank did not prevent the U.S. economy from growing to
become the world’s largest in the long interim. But banking panics and economic
recessions were more frequent than they had been in the early decades when a central
bank was present. Also during the long interim, other leading countries established
central banks and experienced greater economic stability than did the United States. The
U.S. financial panic of 1907 set in motion a sequence of events that led to establishment
of a third Bank of the United States, better known as the Federal Reserve System, in
1914. Once again banking panics and financial crises became less frequent. The advent
of the Fed was a vindication of Hamilton’s original U.S. financial architecture.
Hamilton’s public-debt restructuring and Bank injected tens of millions of dollars
of high-grade debt and equity securities into securities markets from 1790 to 1795 while
he was Treasury Secretary. Federal bonds and Bank stock became the national-market
securities traded in all markets that were established quickly in the country’s leading
cities. In each city, the national-market securities were joined by a growing list of local
securities—those of banking, insurance, transportation, and other corporations chartered
by the states, and also in time a host of state and local governmental debt securities. The
presence of capital markets from the start encouraged the formation of corporations
(Wright in this volume). It also encouraged foreign investors to purchase American34
securities, thereby transferring capital to the United States, by assuring them that liquid
markets for their investments existed in the new country (Sylla, Wilson, and Wright
2006). Absent Hamilton’s policies, capital markets most likely would have emerged and
developed much more gradually in U.S. history, as they did in other countries. It was a
great advantage, both economic and political, for the United States to have modern
capital markets virtually from the nation’s founding.
Hamilton’s strategic planning and execution paid off for the U.S. government and
the American economy. On any fair assessment he deserves the place he occupies in the
pantheons of the American founders and world statesmen. It was he who first realized
the strategic dependence of state power and economic growth on financial development.
It was he who first saw that financial modernization, and hence state power and economic
growth, would be difficult to achieve without changing the form of American
government. It was he who worked as hard as anyone to bring about U.S. constitutional
change. It was he who then deftly executed his well-conceived plan for a financial
revolution in the first term of Washington’s administration, and defended it when
political opposition and events threatened to, and sometimes did, erode the institutions he
created. Part of his genius as a political entrepreneur was to base his plan on precedents
with which many Americans were familiar. The federal revenue system based on import
and excise taxes was a post-colonial version of what the colonies, and then the states, had
long used. The Bank of the United States was modeled to an extent on the Bank of
England, an institution with which many Americans were familiar. It made sense, as
both Jefferson and Hamilton realized, to model the silver U.S. dollar on the Spanish peso
that had long been the most commonly encountered coin in the thirteen colonies and
states. Hamilton’s system, while innovative in both some of its particulars and its
sweeping comprehensiveness, was not wholly new. That served to enhance its appeal
and make it a practical success.
A century ago, the noted American historian Charles Beard (1913, 100; 1915,
131) was not far off the mark when he described Hamilton as “the colossal genius of the
new system,” the one who “displayed that penetrating wisdom which placed him among
the great statesmen of all time.” Compared to when Beard wrote, economists and
historians now have a better understanding of the importance of financial development35
for economic growth, together with a vastly larger store of historical data on the long-
term performance of the U.S. economy. They also have more knowledge of what
Hamilton did at the beginning of U.S. history, how he came to do it, and what the effects
of his policies were. Their findings serve to reinforce Beard’s assessment of Hamilton’s
key role in developing the institutions that raised the trajectory of U.S. economic growth.
He established the financial foundations that would make the United States the most
successful emerging market in the nineteenth century, and the economic colossus of the
next that some would call “the America century.”
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